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SEARCH, SEIZURE, AND SECTION 2255:
A COMMENT
ANTHONY G. AmSTERDAM t
The Fourth Circuit has recently said,' in considered dictum,'
that a claim of illegal search and seizure 3 is available as a ground for
section 2255 'relief ' to a federal defendant who raised the claim at
trial but failed to perfect a timely appeal from conviction. This issue
is one of many receiving new scrutiny as conceptions of the appropriate
scope of postconviction inquiry expand. Its resolution by the Fourth
Circuit, ignoring an impressive body of contrary holdings by the
courts of appeals 5 and the apparently contrary implications of Abel
v. United States,' finds considerable support in Mr. Justice Brennan's
t Assistant Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania. A.B. 1957, Haverford
College; LL.B. 1960, University of Pennsylvania. Member, District of Columbia Bar.
1 United States v. Sutton, 321 F.2d 221 (4th Cir. 1963) (dictum).
2 The statement is gratuitous, as the court affirmed on the merits of the search
and seizure claim the district judge's denial of collateral relief. The search was plainly
legal on either of two independent grounds. See Draper v. United States, 358 U.S.
307 (1959) ; Scher v. United States, 305 U.S. 251 (1938) ; and, as to the scope of the
search, e.g., Hagans v. United States, 315 F.2d 67 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 84 Sup.
Ct. 68 (1963). It is also easily sustainable under the construction which the Fourth
Circuit, United States v. Walker, 307 F.2d 250 (4th Cir. 1962), in common with
other circuits, e.g., Armada v. United States, 319 F.2d 793 (5th Cir. 1963) ; United
States v. Thomas, 319 F.2d 486 (6th Cir. 1963) ; Lawson v. United States, 254 F.2d
706 (8th Cir. 1958), gives to Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925), despite
Mr. Justice Jackson's discussion of Carroll in United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581,
584-87 (1948). One cannot but regard the instant case as a most unlikely vehicle
(no pun intended) for announcement of a radical expansion of § 2255 relief.
a That is, a claim predicated upon the fourth amendment and the exclusionary
rule of Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
428 U.S.C. § 2255 (1958) is presently the principal collateral mechanism by
which a federal prisoner may challenge the validity of his conviction. See United
States v. Hayman, 342 U.S. 205, 210-19 (1952), for the history of the section. Relief
under § 2255 has been said to be "exactly commensurate" with that previously available
in habeas corpus. Hill v. United States, 368 U.S. 424, 427 (1962) ; Sanders v. United
States, 373 U.S. 1, 13-14 (1963). For purposes of this discussion, "scope of relief
available under § 2255" and "scope of available collateral relief" may be treated as
interchangeable terms. See, e.g., Burns v. United States, 321 F.2d 893 (8th Cir. 1963).
5 E.g., Griffin v. United States, 258 F.2d 411 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 357 U.S.
922 (1958) (alternative ground) (issue raised at trial; no appeal); United States v.
Jenkins, 281 F.2d 193 (3d Cir. 1960) (same, seible) ; Armstead v. United States,
318 F.2d 725 (5th Cir. 1963) (issue not raised at trial; no appeal); Thompson v.
United States, 315 F.2d 689 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 84 Sup. Ct. 93 (1963) (history
not set forth) ; Sinks v. United States, 318 F.2d 436 (7th Cir. 1963) (issue raised at
trial; no appeal) ; Warren v. United States, 311 F.2d 673 (8th Cir. 1963) issue raised
at trial; in forna pauperis appeal refused) ; Williams v. United States, 307 F.2d 366
(9th Cir. 1962) (issue raised at trial; untimely appeal filed) ; Way v. United States,
276 F.2d 912 (10th Cir. 1960) (issue not raised on trial or appeal). But see Gaitan
v. United States, 317 F.2d 494 (10th Cir. 1963) (unconsidered dictum) (change of
law).
8362 U.S. 217, 230-34 (1960). The Court's refusal to consider Abel's fourth
amendment attack on the administrative warrant, a claim first raised on certiorari
after explicit disavowal in the district court, seems to assume the unavailability of the
claim on collateral attack. Since the issue was strictly one of law, not depending on
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obiter in Fay v. Noia7 that all constitutional issues can be raised col-
laterally." The Supreme Court's cases do not go as far as the obiter
however, and, with particular regard to a search and seizure claim,
there may be significant reasons to deny a federal prisoner the collateral
remedy.
One must distinguish at the outset the problem of federal habeas
corpus for state prisoners.9 Professor Bator's weighty argument 1o
litigable facts, Supreme Court disposition on the merits would have been in order if
the claim were one which would survive direct appeal. (Concededly, an alternative
explanation of the disposition is that the Court did not regard the claim as one war-
ranting its consideration on certiorari at the time, at least absent appropriate raising
of the issue in the lower courts. I find the alternative the less plausible because I
believe that Mr. Justice Frankfurter would have invoked the Court's certiorari dis-
cretion if he relied on it.) Moreover, for purposes of barring collateral availability
(as opposed to barring appellate consideration as "plain error" under FED. R. CRmi. P.
52(b)), it should be immaterial that Abel's counsel expressly told the trial court that
he was not standing on the point. Whether a claim is thus overtly disavowed or
simply not brought to the attention of the trial court is largely a matter of litigation
fortuities and the perceptiveness of the particular district judge. Disavowal may be,
as well as failure to put the claim forward, the product of counsel's ignorance,
unpreparedness, or bad judgment; it does not, more or less than failure to put the
claim forward, affect any of the considerations, see text accompanying notes 30-37
infra, weighing for or against postconviction recognition of a claim.
7372 U.S. 391, 409 (1963). See also Mr. Justice Douglas' dissent in Hodges v.
United States, 368 U.S. 139, 140 (1961).
The Fourth Circuit's opinion takes the broad ground that "constitutional" and
"jurisdictional" claims are, as such, collaterally available. It does not cite Fay v.
Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963), but relies solely upon a passage in Hill v. United States,
368 U.S. 424, 428-29 (1962), which visibly fails to bear the weight assigned it. True,
other more solid passages may be found among the unpruned shoots that grow in
the "untidy area" (Mr. Justice Frankfurter, dissenting, in Sunal v. Large, 332 U.S.
174, 184 (1947)) of Supreme Court federal collateral attack cases, e.g., Nielsen,
Petitioner, 131 U.S. 176, 184 (1889) ("A party is entitled to a habeas corpius, not merely
where the court is without jurisdiction of the cause, but where it has no constitutional
authority or power to condemn the prisoner.") ; Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1,
16 (1963) (assertion that a coerced confession is "a distinct ground for federal col-
lateral relief" which may or may not be addressed to § 2255 as distinguished from
federal habeas corpus for state prisoners, compare id. at 15, text under numeral II,
with id. at 15 n.8). But these passages, too, are far from establishing a general
doctrine of the collateral availability of constitutional contentions. E.g., Ex parte
Bigelow, 113 U.S. 328 (1885); In re Belt, 159 U.S. 95 (1895); Glasgow v. Moyer,
225 U.S. 420 (1912) (issue first raised on appeal; this should make no difference).
The "untidy area" has recently been exhaustively canvassed by the opinions in Fay
v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963), and by Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal
Habeas Corpus fdr State Prisoners, 76 Hagv. L. REv. 441 (1963). See also Judge
Fahy's excellent opinion in the first (1959) Hodges appeal, set out in Hodges v.
United States, 282 F.2d 858, 864 (D.C. Cir. 1960), cert. dismissed, 368 U.S. 139
(1961) (an opinion whose reasoning survives its reliance on Darr v. Burford, 339
U.S. 200 (1950)), and Judge Friendly's careful statement in United States v. Sobell,
314 F.2d 314, 322-23 (2d Cir. 1963). See also Vandergrift v. United States, 313 F.2d
93, 95 (9th Cir. 1963). Neither does the Supreme Court's reversal in Jordan v.
United States, 352 U.S. 904 (1956) (per curiam), reversing 233 F.2d 362 (D.C. Cir.
1956), suggest more than that denial of a speedy trial, there in issue, may in some
circumstances work such prejudice against the possibility of a fair trial as to out-
weigh the considerations which elsewhere preclude untimely assertion of even con-
stitutional rights by an accused. Cf. United States v. Chase, 135 F. Supp. 230 (N.D.
Ill. 1955) ; text at notes 30-37 infra. It can hardly be supposed that Jordan, rendered
without opinion and without dissent, was intended fundamentally to remake the law
of federal-prisoner collateral relief.
928 U.S.C. § 2241 (1958).
-o Bator, supra note 8.
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notwithstanding, there are substantial justifications for federal district
court litigation or relitigation of federal contentions invoked in bar
of a state criminal conviction. Volume of cases and inadequate state
procedures make reliance on the. Supreme Court unsatisfactory here; "
the Court is not properly a routine enforcement agency; in any event,
with perhaps greater reason than supports the district courts' federal
question, civil rights, and specified removal jurisdictions-not to speak
of the diversity, jurisdiction '2-- it makes good sense to give a state
criminal defendant a federal judge to try the facts underlying his
federal constitutional claim.'3 Absent an applicable removal pro-
vision, Brown v. Allen 4 thus construed the federal habeas corpus
jurisdiction, and Fay v. Noia '5 -maugre Mr. Justice Brennan's
excursus into the history of the writ as it affected federal prisoners
before enactment of section 2255--did no more than hold that a claim
which might have been relitigated by a federal district judge following
disposition on the merits by a state court may also be relitigated, or
initially litigated, by a federal district judge to whom the prisoner
comes without having properly put his federal claim before the state
judiciary.
Consideration of the large federal-state significance of this latter
holding is beyond my purpose; accepting Fay v. Noia as the law, I
advert to it only to point out that it does not speak to the condition
of the federal prisoner. The federal accused, unlike the state accused,
is given a federal forum from the start. He may litigate his constitu-
tional contention to a federal trier, take a direct appeal to a federal
court of appeals; 16 if he does and loses on the merits, there is no
reason (absent a botched presentation by counsel " or a claim of new
11 Reitz, Federal Habeas Corpus: Postconviction Remedy for State Prisoners,
108 U. PA. L. REv. 461 (1960).
1228 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1343, 1441-43, 1332 (1958), respectively. Compare Mishkin,
The Federal "Question" in the District Courts, 53 CoLum. L. REv. 157 (1953); ALI
STUDY OF THE DIVISION OF JURISDIcTION BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS 36-44
(Tent. Draft No. 1, 1963). The analogy between the federal habeas corpus and
removal jurisdictions was explicitly drawn in Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 415-16
(1963), and justifies the hearing standards of Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293 (1963).
13 I therefore concur with Professor Bender that federal habeas corpus lies to
review a state prisoner's claim based upon Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), and
Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963). See Bender, The Retroactive Effect of an
Overruling Constitutional Decision: Mapp v. Ohio, 110 U. PA. L. REv. 650, 655-57
(1962). I do not discuss the retroactivity question. Compare Hall v. Warden, 313
F.2d 483 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 374 U.S. 809 (1963), with United States er rel.
Linldetter v. Walker, 323 F.2d 11 (5th Cir. 1963).
14344 U.S. 443 (1953).
15 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
1628 U.S.C. § 1291 (1958), whence review by certiorari may be had in the
Supreme Court, 28 U.S.C. § 1254 (1958).7 By botched presentation I do not mean such egregious ineptitude of counsel
as will per se sustain a sixth amendment ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim. For
the prevailing sixth amendment standard, see, e.g., Mitchell v. United States, 259 F.2d
787 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 850 (1958). See discussion in note 60 infra.
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evidence 8) to allow relitigation collaterally. 9 Of course when the
constitutional contention is not disposed of on the merits at trial and
on appeal (or when the disposition is impugned by a botched presenta-
tion or new evidence), there is substantially more justification for its
collateral availability. But this is a matter involving considerations
other than those which determined Fay v. Noia. Granted Mr. Noia
does not lose the federal habeas corpus hearing, to which Brown v.
Allen entitles him from the beginning, merely because he fails to press
his federal claim before a state tribunal which in no case could dispose
of it definitively against him. It does not follow that the federal
accused who fails to present a timely and effective constitutional con-
tention to a potentially dispositive federal forum thereby gains a second
litigating opportunity which would not otherwise have been open
to him.
Whether he should have such an opportunity with respect to a
search and seizure claim is a question requiring initial inquiry into
I8 By new evidence I do not mean evidence acquired under circumstances which
qualify it as "newly discovered" for purposes of relief under FED. R. CRIM. P. 33.
The rule is available for claims of after-discovered evidence tending to show preju-
dicial error in the trial process, e.g., Mitchell v. United States, 368 U.S. 439 (1962)
(per curiam), vacating 293 F.2d 161 (D.C. Cir. 1961); Holmes v. United States,
284 F.2d 716 (4th Cir. 1960) ; Rubenstein v. United States, 227 F.2d 638 (10th Cir.
1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 993 (1956), as well as for claims of after-discovered
evidence going to the merits. But to obtain relief within the rule, a defendant must
meet certain requirements, including the traditional requirement of due diligence, e.g.,
United States v. Costello, 255 F.2d 876 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 357 U.S. 937, rehearing
denied, 358 U.S. 858 (1958), and the two-year limitation of rule 33. See discussion
in note 60 infra.
19 It can hardly be contended that a second federal trier is more likely to come
to "truth" (putting aside Mr. Pirandello's problem) than a first; within a judicial
system, therefore, there is ordinarily no justification for failing to give preponderant
weight to the considerations underlying the doctrine of collateral estoppel. If a
fairly tried disposition on the merits of a first § 2255 motion will allow denial without
hearing of a repeater paper under § 2255, 115 (as Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1
(1963), seems to envision), then a similarly fairly tried disposition on the merits at
trial and on direct appeal ought equally to allow denial without hearing of the first
paper under the "files and records" provision of § 2255, 3. E.g., Malone v. United
States, 257 F.2d 177 (6th Cir. 1958) ; Davis v. United States, 311 F.2d 495 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 374 U.S. 846 (1963) ; Franano v. United States, 303 F.2d 470 (8th Cir.),
cert. denied, 371 U.S. 865 (1962); Fiano v. United States, 291 F.2d 113 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 943 (1961) (alternative ground). Compare Heflin v.
United States, 358 U.S. 415 (1959), reversing 251 F.2d 69 (5th Cir. 1958) (rule 35).
Compare Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 423 (1963) ("Hence, the familiar principle that
res judicata is inapplicable in habeas proceedings . . . is really but an instance of
the larger principle that void judgments may be collaterally impeached."), with
Baldwin v. Iowa State Traveling Men's Ass'n, 283 U.S. 522 (1931). As a practical
matter, with federal postconviction litigation today confined largely to the identical
courts before which direct litigation was had, see note 27 infra, a claim raised col-
laterally following its rejection on the merits of direct appeal is bound to receive
short shrift, whether the judge describes his ruling as "collateral estoppel" or "we've
done this once already."
Where the constitutional claim has thus been disposed of on direct appeal by a
court of appeals and certiorari has been denied, I take it no one would seek to support
the availability of collateral relitigation on the ground that by such relitigation an-
other opportunity for discretionary Supreme Court review is afforded. Such an
argument sustains the entertaining of repeater motions ad infinitum or it sustains
nothing.
1964]
382 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
considerations which in general govern the availability of section 2255
to raise contentions not disposed of on the merits of direct appeal.2
I do not pretend to attempt a definitive formulation, but sketch my
premises.21
(1) Traditionally, two sets of characteristics of collateral litiga-
tion have shaped the federal doctrines defining the scope of post-
conviction remedies. First, there has been what may be called a
"jurisdictional" factor involved where the collateral proceeding places
a claim before a different tribunal from that in which the direct
proceeding is had. This jurisdictional factor-concerned with the
allocation of power among court systems 2--was a critical determinant
in the development by the English common-law judges of the writ of
habeas corpus ad subjiciendum as an instrument to preserve and
enlarge their jurisdiction at the expense of rival courts.23  The "juris-
dictional" language inherited from the English tradition was con-
veniently twisted by the Supreme Court of the United States, in the
nineteenth century, to resist the imposition on the Court by habeas
corpus of a general reviewing function over federal criminal cases
which the lack of statutory authority for direct review prior to 1889
made manifest that Congress did not intend the Court to have.24 The
adage that the writ went only to inquire into jurisdiction adequately
2 0 For the reasons stated in note 19 supra, I begin with the proposition that a
§2255 motion may be denied on the papers if: (1) it presents only issues already
rejected on the merits of direct appeal by a court of appeals, and (2) it contains
neither allegations of new evidence, note 18 supra, nor allegations of a botched
presentation by counsel, note 17 supra. In note 60 infra, I consider the effect of the
latter allegations.
21 The substance of parts (1) and (2), following, was presented in a lecture,
Jan. 29, 1963, before the Federal Defense Panel Seminar, as one of five sessions on
basic criminal procedure sponsored by the Philadelphia Bar Association's Committee
on Professional Education in conjunction with the Junior Bar Association. In view
of the opinions in Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963), and Professor Bator's excellent
treatment, note 8 supra, expanded documentation here is unnecessary.
22 During the critical nineteenth century struggle for national supremacy in this
country, the writ of habeas corpus was a frequent weapon both of the national and
the state courts. In addition to the history set out in Fay v. Noia, supra note 21,
at 401 n.9, see, e.g., 2 WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY
258-64, 332-43 (rev. ed. 1932) (Booth's case); 2 id. at 344-45 (the Oberlin rescue
cases) ; Trieber, The Relationship of the State and National Courts, 42 AM. L. REv.
321, 333 (1908) (other fugitive slave law collisions).
2 See 9 HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 104-25 (1926); Jenks, The
Story of the Habeas Corpus, 18 L.Q. REv. 64 (1902).
24 Ex parte Watkins, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 193 (1830) ; and following the Act of
Feb. 5, 1867, ch. 28, 14 Stat. 385 (as to which, see Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 309,
329-31 (1915); but see Bator, supra note 8, at 474-77), e.g., Ex parte Parks, 93
U.S. 18 (1876) ; Ex parte Bigelow, 113 U.S. 328 (1885). Before 1889 there was, in
practical effect, no appellate review in federal criminal cases. See the statutory de-
velopment set forth in Bator, supra note 8, at 473 n.75. Occasion for possible Su-
preme Court review on certificate of division of opinion in the circuit court was
rendered rare by the practice of single district judges holding circuit court. See
FRANxKFURTER & LANDIS, THE BUSINESS OF THE SUPREME COURT 31-32, 79-80 (1927).
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confined the Court's appellate activity, while desired expansions were
worked under the aegis of the "jurisdictional" conception 2 5 which
blew balloon-thin and burst in Johnson v. Zerbst.26 Within the present
framework of federal trial and appellate jurisdiction, collateral attack
by section 2255 motion takes the federal convict into no forum which
he might not reach directly. Whatever its contemporary significance
in the administration of federal habeas corpus for state prisoners, the
"jurisdictional" concept has lost all useful meaning as a measure of
intrafederal (section 2255) review. 8 In this area it is neither neces-
sary nor worth the contortion required to preserve the old phraseology
for the purpose of investing "jurisdiction" with new epicyclic con-
notations: "to test proceedings so fundamentally lawless that imprison-
ment pursuant to them is not merely erroneous but void." 29
(2) The second-and presently determinative-set of character-
istics of collateral litigation may be denominated aspects of a "finality"
factor. They involve (a) duplication of judicial effort; (b) delay in
setting the criminal proceeding at rest; (c) inconvenience and possibly
2 5 E.g., Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371 (1879). The same circumstance-lack
of congressional authorization of direct Supreme Court review-which ordinarily
served the Court as a counsel of self-restraint in the exercise of its habeas corpus
jurisdiction, also created inordinate pressure for expansion of the writ's scope in the
"hard," otherwise unreviewable criminal case.
26304 U.S. 458 (1938); see Waley 'v. Johnston, 316 U.S. 101, 104-05 (1942)
(per curiam).
.27Both direct and collateral routes make available appeal as of right to the
appropriate circuit court of appeals, with discretionary review by certiorari in the
Supreme Court. See note 16 supra; 28 U.S.C. §§ 2253, 2255, 6 (1958). Concerning
the exercise of the Supreme Court's "original" powers, see Oaks, The "Original" Writ
of Habeas Corpus in the Supreme Court, in 1962 SUPREmE COURT REvmIw 153
(Kurland ed.). Since the shift in 1948 from habeas corpus in the district of confine-
ment, Ahrens v. Clark, 335 U.S. 188 (1948), to § 2255 motion in the sentencing court,
28 U.S.C. § 2255, 1 (1958), as the principal mode of federal-prisoner collateral
attack, 28 U.S.C. § 2255, 4 7 (1958) ; e.g., Birchfield v. United States, 296 F.2d 120
(5th Cir. 1961), federal prisoners pursue their collateral remedies not merely in the
same sort of forum in which they litigated directly, but in the identical court, fre-
quently before the identical judges. See, e.g., D.C.N.D. ILL. R. 23, 17, set out in
Appendix 2 to Committee on Habeas Corpus, U.S. Judicial Conference, Report, 33
F.R.D. 367, 391, 393 (1963). (The same is true of the coram nobis remedy under
United States v. Morgan, 346 U.S. 502 (1954), and of motions under FFD. R. CaM. P.
32(d), 33, and 35, where these are applicable.)
28 This is not intended to suggest that advocacy eschew use of the "jurisdictional"
rubric when the nature of the claim will bear the label. The text of the statute
retains the word: "If the court finds that the judgment was rendered without juris-
diction, . . . or that there has been such a denial or infringement of the constitutional
rights of the prisoner as to render the judgment vulnerable to collateral attack, . . .
[the court shall grant appropriate relief]." 28 U.S.C. § 2255, 3 (1958). (Emphasis
added.) Compare 28 U.S.C. § 2255, 1 (1958). And the courts remain rather
hospitable-indeed, perhaps unduly hospitable under the "exceptional circumstances"
doctrine of Bowen v. Johnston, 306 U.S. 19 (1939)-to "jurisdiction"-sounding claims.
E.g., United States v. Lovely, 319 F.2d 673 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 84 Sup. Ct. 210
(1963) (rejecting claim on merits); Hilderbrand v. United States, 261 F.2d 354
(9th Cir. 1958). But Toy Toy v. Hopkins, 212 U.S. 542 (1909), refuses to allow
collateral litigation dehors the original record of contested facts underlying the "juris-
dictional claim."
29 Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 423 (1963). Compare Brennan Judicial Super-
vision of Criminal Law Administration, 9 CameE & DELINQUENCY 227, 232 (1963).
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danger in transporting a prisoner to the sentencing court for hearing;
(d) postponed litigation of fact, hence litigation which will often be
less reliable in reproducing the facts (i) respecting the postconviction
claim itself, and (ii) respecting the issue of guilt if the collateral attack
succeeds in a form which allows retrial (the burden of proof of guilt on
retrial, of course, remaining with the prosecutor). In combination,
these finality considerations amount to a more or less persuasive argu-
ment against the cognizability of any particular collateral claim, the
strength of the argument depending upon the nature of the claim, the
manner of its treatment (if any) in the conviction proceedings, and
the circumstances under which collateral litigation must be had. A
claim that the movant pleaded guilty to a crime under a statute un-
constitutional "on its face" offends none of the finality elements sig-
nificantly; " a claim that he was irresponsible by reason of insanity
at the time of the crime" for which he was ten years ago given a full
trial without his raising the issue, significantly offends them all.32,
30 The only enumerated element even colorably involved is (b), the matter of
repose. Repose in conviction under a constitutionally unauthorized statute, however,
does not serve the deterrent or rehabilitative purposes of the criminal law. But for
Glasgow v. Moyer, 225 U.S. 420 (1912) (claim first raised on habeas corpus appeal,
but this should make no difference), the Supreme Court has consistently entertained
federal prisoners' collateral challenges to the "face" constitutionality of the underlying
criminal statute. E.g., Baender v. Barnett, 255 U.S. 224 (1921) (rejecting claim on
merits) ; Matter of Gregory, 219 U.S. 210 (1911) (same) ; Ex parte Yarbrough, 110
U.S. 651 (1884) (same) ; Ex parte Curtis, 106 U.S. 371 (1882) (same) ; Ex parte
Siebold, 100 U.S. 371 (1879) (same). Two cases cited to the contrary in Bator, supra
note 8, at 474 n.77, are, I think, inapposite: In re Lincoln, 202 U.S. 178 (1906), apart
from its alternative reliance on the mootness ground of Ex parte Baez, 177 U.S. 378
(1900), rests on the principle of Ex parte Mirzan, 119 U.S. 584 (1887), that the
Supreme Court will not ordinarily exercise its original habeas jurisdiction where
remedies in the lower courts are available; and Henry v. Henkel, 235 U.S. 219 (1914),
involves pretrial application for the writ, as to which compare Rodman v. Pothier,
264 U.S. 399 (1924), with Bowen v. Johnston, 306 U.S. 19 (1939), and see, e.g.,
Jones v. Perkins, 245 U.S. 390 (1918) (disposition on another ground) ; Johnson v.
Hoy, 227 U.S. 245 (1913) (alternative ground); In re Chapman, 156 U.S. 211
(1895). The rule may well be different where the challenge is to the statute as
applied and evidence must at some point be taken on the issue; query, however, the
propriety of refusing relief in Heinecke v. United States, 316 F.2d 685 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied, 84 Sup. Ct. 101 (1963) (obscenity), where the evidence, presumably,
was documentary.
31 As distinguished from the claim of incompetency to stand trial. The latter claim
is collaterally available. E.g., Bishop v. United States, 350 U.S. 961 (1956) (per
curiam) ; Bostic v. United States, 298 F.2d 678 (D.C. Cir. 1961) ; United States v.
Cannon, 310 F.2d 841 (2d Cir. 1962); Nelms v. United States, 318 F.2d 150 (4th
Cir. 1963) ; Gregori v. United States, 243 F.2d 48 (5th Cir. 1957) ; Taylor v. United
States, 282 F.2d 16 (8th Cir. 1960); Bell v. United States, 269 F.2d 419 (9th Cir.
1959). The Tenth Circuit is contra, e.g., Nunley v. United States, 283 F.2d 651
(10th Cir. 1960), but seemingly on the narrow ground that 18 U.S.C. § 4245 (1958)
provides an exclusive administrative channel of relief.
32 Bishop v. United States, 223 F.2d 582 (D.C. Cir. 1955), rev'd on other grounds,
350 U.S. 961 (1956) ; Hereden v. United States, 286 F.2d 526 (10th Cir. 1961) ; cf.
Taylor v. United States, 282 F.2d 16 (8th Cir. 1960) (plea) (remand on other
grounds).
33 In the case of federal habeas for state prisoners, the total impact of the finality
considerations as they operate uniquely upon each habeas corpus case is a part of
the gross price which the federal system pays under Brown v. Allen to give the
prisoner his 'federal judge. The price is high, no doubt, but the stakes are also high
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Against the weight of whatever argument the finality factor presents in
a particular case must be heard the counter-arguments of considerations
which may militate in favor of collateral availability: the argument
that there existed some obstacle or impediment to the accused's use
of ordinary direct procedures for making his contention; 3' the argu-
ment that the error in his case appears so patent "on the face" of the
for the prisoner, and the alternatives-leaving federal "fact," together with much of
federal "law," to the state trier; establishing federal removal jurisdiction over state
criminal cases involving federal defensive claims-seem no less unsatisfactory. What
for present purposes needs reiterating is that under BrowL v. Allen's resolution of
the federal-state dilemma it is inevitable from the outset that a state accused who is
convicted after state rejection on the merits of his federal claim will have a federal
collateral forum, whereas there is no such inevitability in the case of the federal
accused. Mr. Justice Brennan rightly states the issue in Fay v. Noia as whether a
failure directly to press the federal claim should be penalized by withdrawal of the
otherwise open federal forum; he resolves that issue by concluding that the penalty
is unnecessary. Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 433-34 (1963). With the federal accused,
however, the question is not one of penalty-not whether he shall be taxed by unusual
consequences for failing timely to raise his claim; it is whether, in light of the finality
considerations as they affect his case, the system best serves the ends of a rational
criminal justice by providing him an unusual second opportunity to litigate.
34 (1) Certain challenges to a conviction proceeding necessarily involve the
assertion that, if the facts underlying the challenge are true, the conviction proceeding
offered inadequate opportunity to litigate the ground of the challenge itself. Con-
sider (a) the incompetency cases, note 31 supra, (b) the claim of violation of the
sixth amendment right to counsel in that defendant neither had nor waived counsel,
e.g., Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938) (trial) ; Walker v. Johnston, 312 U.S.
275 (1941) (plea), or that counsel was ineffective, e.g., Frand v. United States, 289
F.2d 693 (10th Cir. 1961) (trial) ; Reed v. United States, 291 F.2d 856 (4th Cir. 1961)
(alternative ground) (plea), or (c) the claim that defendant's guilty plea was
coerced, e.g., Thomas v. United States, 271 F.2d 500 (D.C. Cir. 1959) ; Domenica v.
United States, 292 F.2d 483 (1st Cir. 1961), induced by promises of leniency, e.g.,
Machibroda v. United States, 368 U.S. 487 (1962); Shelton v. United States, 356
U.S. 26 (1958) (per curiam), reversing on confession of error 246 F.2d 571 (5th
Cir. 1957), or not understandingly made, e.g., United States v. Davis, 212 F.2d 264
(7th Cir. 1954) ; Smith v. United States, 309 F.2d 165 (9th Cir. 1962) (prosecutor
misled defendant). (2) In other cases there may be allegations of litigation obstacles
extrinsic to the claims sought to be raised collaterally. A hearing has been given on
allegations that government officials physically obstructed defendant's attempt to
appeal. Hill v. United States, 256 F.2d 957 (6th Cir. 1958), aff'd after remand, 268
F.2d 203 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 854 (1959). But see Thompson v. United
States, 315 F.2d 689 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 84 Sup. Ct. 93 (1963). Judicial frus-
tration of the right to appeal by denial 6f leave to proceed in forma pauperis prior to
Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438 (1962), has not yet been recognized as a
distinct ground of relief. See Armstrong v. United States, 320 F.2d 330 (6th Cir.
1963). The Ninth Circuit's recent decision in Dodd v. United States, 321 F.2d 240,
245 (9th Cir. 1963), that trial counsel's failure to take an appeal notwithstanding in-
structions by defendant to do so authorizes collateral review of the trial proceedings
at least for "plain reversible error in the trial," constitutes the first significant break
since Council v. Clemmer, 165 F.2d 249 (D.C. Cir. 1947), aff'd after remand, 177 F.2d
22 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 880 (1949), in a considerable body of cases
denying relief where appeal has been lost by counsel's wilful or careless neglect. See,
in addition to the numerous cases cited in Dodd v. United States, supra, Bolden v.
United States, 320 F.2d 662 (7th Cir. 1963); Williams v. United States, 307 F.2d
366 (9th Cir. 1962) ; Moore v. Aderhold, 108 F.2d 729 (10th Cir. 1939) ; cf. Hodges
v. United States, 282 F.2d 858 (D.C. Cir. 1960), cert. dismissed, 368 U.S. 139 (1961),
with which compare the Fifth Circuit's ingenious appeal-time-tolling holding in
Boruff v. United States, 310 F.2d 918 (5th Cir. 1962). Similar in spirit to Dodd is
Calland v. United States, 323 F.2d 405 (7th Cir. 1963). (3) See generally United
States ex rel. McCann v. Adams, 320 U.S. 220 (1943) (confession of error), and
the excellent general discussion in Smith v. United States, 187 F.2d 192 (D.C. Cir.
1950), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 927 (1951).
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conviction record that, far from engaging the court in further factual
inquiry, his claim self-evidently demonstrates a failure of the judicial
process shocking to the court's house-cleaning sense; " the argument
that the right he invokes is fundamental in the sense that its enforce-
ment in his case is important to society.36  I advisedly pose the com-
peting determinants in terms of "arguments" and "counter-arguments"
rather than as factors in a mathematical formula. Where determin-
ants are, as here, merely clustering points for vague accumulations of
attitudes and factual assumptions,3 7 greater precision at the level of
generalization would be useless.
(3) Coming specifically to the search and seizure question, I find
that the factors favoring finality may range from moderately to
strongly persuasive. The search and seizure claim may be proffered
collaterally (a) following a guilty plea, (b) following trial [and
appeal] at which the issue was not raised, (c) following trial at which
the issue was raised and decided adversely to the accused, whereupon
the accused (i) failed to perfect an appeal (for any of a number of
reasons) or (ii) did not raise the issue on appeal, or (d) following
trial and appeal on both of which the issue was resolved against the
accused." I have said that in situation (d) collateral attack should
not be available, since it serves no function but to put before the same
35 Compare the cases disallowing collateral attack where the movant proposes
to show by evidence aliunde that the charging paper fails to charge an offense, e.g.,
United States v. Gallagher, 183 F.2d 342 (3d Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 913
(1951) (plea); Clark v. United States, 273 F.2d 68 (6th Cir. 1959), cert. denied,
362 U.S. 979 (1960) (plea), or where it appears that the paper may be technically
insufficient, e.g., Hutcheson v. United States, 320 F.2d 721 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
84 Sup. Ct. 198 (1963) (trial); Stegall v. United States, 259 F.2d 83 (6th Cir.),
cert. denied, 358 U.S. 886 (1958) (trial) ; Roth v. United States, 295 F.2d 364 (8th
Cir. 1961) (trial), with the cases allowing collateral attack where the paper affirma-
tively alleges facts which demonstrate that no federal offense was committed, e.g.,
Melvin v. United States, 316 F.2d 647 (7th Cir. 1963) (plea) ; Marteney v. United
States, 216 F.2d 760 (10th Cir. 1954) (plea). But see the Seventh Circuit's extra-
ordinary extensions of this latter doctrine in Robinson v. United States, 313 F.2d 817
(7th Cir. 1963) (trial), and Lauer v. United States, 320 F.2d 187 (7th Cir. 1963)
(trial). Compare Rivera v. United States, 318 F.2d 606 (9th Cir. 1963) (trial)
(remanded on other grounds).
36 Claims of constitutional dimension will ordinarily be seen as more "fundamental"
in this sense than nonconstitutional claims. See note 8 supra and accompanying text.
But the constitutional nature of the claim is not eo ipso sufficient to justify its col-
lateral availability; the Court's cases allowing relief have all been within the category
of "those exceptional cases where the conviction has been in disregard of the con-
stitutional rights of the accused, and where the writ is the only effective means of
preserving his rights." Waley v. Johnston, 316 U.S. 101, 105 (1942). (Emphasis
added.)
37Attitudes, for example, respecting the importance of certain constitutional
claims; factual assumptions respecting the causes of criminal behavior, the means of
operation (if any) of the criminal law as a deterrent of prohibited conduct, and the
factors which affect treatment and the prisoner's adjustment under treatment.
38 Other possible litigation situations resolve themselves basically into the enumer-
ated ones.
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or another federal judge or set of federal judges issues which the
federal judiciary has once resolved as competently as there is any
reason to believe the federal judiciary can resolve them." The Fourth
Circuit case presents situation (c) (i) 4' which, with situation (c) (ii),
is weakest for finality. Still, the finality factors here are considerable:
(A) A second federal district judge will have to read the trial
transcript and hear argument (probably by appointed counsel) in
order to rule upon a claim already litigated before one federal district
judge. (B) It has been proved beyond the trier's reasonable doubt
by reliable (albeit allegedly unconstitutionally obtained) evidence that
the movant is one of that class of persons who the Congress has
decreed shall be subject to criminal penalties in order to restrain them
(if necessary) and rehabilitate them (if possible) and to deter others
from engaging in similar undesirable conduct. Concededly, we know
virtually nothing about the actual operation of the deterrent and re-
habilitative principles upon which the legislation is based, but-at
least pending acquisition of more complete knowledge-it is not a
presumptuous working assumption that long-protracted adversary liti-
gation of an issue in the nature of a plea in bar hardly furthers the
deterrent or rehabilitative efficacy of the law.41 (C) If the movant's
claim prevails, the Government will face its burden of proof on retrial
after a more or less substantial lapse of time that would not have been
occasioned had the search and seizure issue been pressed on direct
appeal.42 In the case of search and seizure situations (a) and (b)
supra-where the claim is made for the first time collaterally-there
are (D) the problem of delayed litigation of the search and seizure
issue itself, ordinarily an issue turning on contested facts not sus-
ceptible of documentary proof,43 and (E) the various custodial prob-
39 See note 19 supra and accompanying text. The qualifications in notes 17 and 18
supra are discussed in note 60 infra.4o Although the Fourth Circuit's opinion is not clear on the point, it appears that
the search and seizure issue was litigated collaterally on the basis of the trial tran-
script and that no evidentiary hearing was had on the § 2255 motion.
41 Professor Bator puts the point less tentatively. Bator, supra note 8, at 451-52.
4 2 It is difficult to know in what percentage of cases suppression before trial
would leave the Government sufficient untainted evidence to proceed, and in what
percentage of that percentage a lapse of time would make the untainted evidence
unavailable. One may hazard, however, a few tentative assertions. (1) Claims
of illegal search and seizure are frequent in narcotics and liquor cases. (2) In such
cases, the use of "special employees" and undercover agents will frequently cause the
Government (a) to go to trial on evidence obtained at the time of a defendant's arrest
without presenting other available evidence which would disclose the identity of em-
ployees or agents, and (b) in the not unusual case where several transactions might
be proved against the defendant, to prosecute only for those transactions whose possible
litigation does not necessitate unmasking of employees or agents. (3) Special em-
ployees, particularly, tend to peregrinism and, although available at the time of initial
prosecution, may thereafter stray.
43 Concededly, the commonplace doctrines of collateral attack put the burden of
persuasion on the movant to establish his § 2255 claim. E.g., Twining v. United
States, 321 F.2d 432 (5th Cir. 1963). In search and seizure cases, however, the
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lems involved in bringing the prisoner into court when his presence
at a collateral hearing is necessary.44
(4) These last two considerations offer grounds for distinction
among the litigation situations supposed; " however, for reasons which
are common to all search and seizure claims, I would hold even a
slight finality interest sufficient to deny the collateral remedy. The
dispositive factor, I think, lies in one dimension of a problem briefly
mentioned above: how important it is to society that the movant's
claim be enforced.46 The claim here is of a right to have illegally
obtained evidence excluded at trial. I conclude not only that society
has no interest in the enforcement of such a claim collaterally, but that
society has the strongest sort of interest against its enforcement.
I do not mean to revivify here the entire exclusionary rule debate.
Weeks 47 has long since settled the basic issue in the federal courts-
rightly I believe. However, it will not do to forget that the Weeks
rule is a rule arrived at only on the nicest balance of competing con-
siderations and in view of the necessity of finding some effective
judicial sanction to preserve the Constitution's search and seizure
guarantees. The rule is unsupportable as reparation or compensa-
tory dispensation to the injured criminal; 48 its sole rational justifica-
tion is the experience of its indispensability in "exert[ing] general legal
pressures to secure obedience to the Fourth Amendment on the part
allocation of the burden is likely to be relatively unimportant. Issues here turn on
such questions as whether the accused consented to a search (ordinarily a question
to be resolved by crediting one of two irreconcilable versions of the facts), or whether
there was probable cause for arrest without a warrant (a question which can prac-
ticably be resolved in no other way than to ask that the Government affirmatively
show the facts on the basis of which its agents acted).
44 Petitioner's presence will be necessary whenever he asserts that he can testify
to facts pertinent to his collateral claim. E.g., Juelich v. United States, 316 F.2d 726
(5th Cir. 1963), and cases cited therein.
45 Of course, in situation (a), the guilty plea, the courts reject a search and
seizure claim summarily. E.g., Edwards v. United States, 256 F.2d 707 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied, 358 U.S. 847 (1958) ; United States v. Zavada, 291 F.2d 189 (6th Cir.
1961). This is consonant with the attenuation of taint principle. Notes 53, 56 infra.
46 See text at note 36 supra.
47 Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
48 "The rule is calculated to prevent, not to repair. Its purpose is to deter-to
compel respect for the constitutional guaranty in the only effectively available way-
by removing the incentive to disregard it." Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206,
217 (1960) (speaking of "the exclusionary rule," ibid., elsewhere identified as, or with,
"the exclusionary rule of Weeks," id. at 210, 218). What Mr. Justice Black said for
the Court concerning the doctrine of Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251
U.S. 385 (1920), applies equally to the Weeks rule itself: "It is an extraordinary
sanction, judicially imposed, to limit searches and seizures to those conducted in strict
compliance with the commands of the Fourth Amendment." United States v. Wallace
& Tiernan Co., 336 U.S. 793, 796 (1949). But see Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 661-66
(1961) (Black, J., concurring). Compare Mr. Justice Clark's description of the
Weeks rule in Mapp, supra at 648, as a "clear, specific, and constitutionally required
-even if judicially implied--deterrent safeguard."
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of federal law-enforcing officers." " As it serves this function, the
rule is a needed, but grudingly taken, medicament; no more should be
swallowed than is needed to combat the disease. Granted that so
many criminals must go free as will deter the constables from blunder-
ing,"0 pursuance of this policy of liberation beyond the confines of
necessity inflicts gratuitous harm on the public interest as declared
by Congress.
Let me put the case another way. In every litigation in which
exclusion is in issue, a strong public interest in deterring official il-
legality is balanced against a strong public interest in convicting the
guilty. 1  As the exclusionary rule is applied time after time, it seems
that its deterrent efficacy at some stage reaches a point of diminishing
returns, and beyond that point its continued application is a public
nuisance. The courts apparently have recognized this; the foggy doc-
trines of "standing" 52 and "attenuation of taint" 5' appear responsive
to it. The Supreme Court has not yet constituted every criminal
accused a private Attorney General, 4 to enforce the fourth amend-
49 Mr. Justice Frankfurter, dissenting, in Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206,
233, 235 (1960). Save for a single penultimate paragraph, Professor Bender's demon-
stration that the exclusionary rule of Mapp obtains no support from self-incrimination
principles is equally applicable to Weeks. Bender, supra note 13, at 664-68. The
demonstration is plainly sufficient without the paragraph, and I rest on it. As for
the judicial house-cleaning argument, this seems to me to involve a petitio principii.
If the fourth amendment does require judicial scrutiny of evidence to assure against
its unlawful obtention, the court that does not scrutinize indeed has an unclean house.
But if the amendment does not require scrutiny-as, for example, it does not require
scrutiny into the legality of arrest of the accused who is haled before the court, see
note 56 infra,-then I fail to see wherein uncleanness lies. I take it that a court may
not permissibly be driven by disgust to discharge an accused merely because he has
been shabbily treated, but that the court may attach legal consequences to its disgust
only within the limits of the judiciary's function to enforce by appropriate means the
Constitution and laws. See United States v. Mitchell, 322 U.S. 65 (1944). Compare
Elkins v. United States, supra, with Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465 (1921).
60 1 echo Mr. Justice Cardozo, then Judge Cardozo, in People v. Defore, 242 N.Y.
13, 21, 150 N.E. 585, 587 (1926).
51 The undisputably reliable character of the physical evidence which, in the
main, has felt the burden of the exclusionary rule, justifies the word "guilty." I
would hesitate to use the term in a contested confession case. And I do not intend to
suggest by "public interest in convicting the guilty," that the public interest needs-
or that Congress wants-conviction of every individual who violates the law. I
mean only that Congress conceives the public interest to require conviction in all
cases in which the Government elects to prosecute and proves its substantive case.
52 E.g., Tindle v. United States, No. 17806, D.C. Cir., Oct. 10, 1963; United
States v. Serrano, 317 F.2d 356 (2d Cir. 1963) ; Armada v. United States, 319 F.2d
793 (5th Cir. 1963) (uncontested).
63 E.g., Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963) (Wong Sun's arrest);
Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62 (1954) ; Wayne v. United States, 318 F.2d 205
(D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 84 Sup. Ct. 125 (1963); United States v. Paroutian, 319
F.2d 661 (2d Cir. 1963) ; United States v. Zimple, 318 F.2d 676 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
84 Sup. Ct. 128 (1963) (alternative ground); cf. Smith v. United States, No. 17466,
D.C. Cir., Sept. 26, 1963 (Mallory).
,4 Judge Frank, in Associated Indus. v. Ickes, 134 F.2d 694, 704 (2d Cir.), re-
inanded for consideration of mootness, 320 U.S. 707 (1943).
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ment,55 nor has it said that illegal arrest or illegal search and seizure
stand per se as a bar to prosecution."' Where the lines of "standing"
and "attentuation" will ultimately fall I confess I cannot guess. I do
not now see any rational way to run them, for the point which they
appear designed (albeit inarticulately and unsystematically designed)
to mark-the point of diminishing returns of the deterrence principle-
cannot be known until much more is known about the way deterrence
works in fact than now seems knowable.5" But if there is one class
of cases that I would hazard to say is very probably beyond the point
of diminishing returns, it is the class of search and seizure claims
raised collaterally. For, so far as the law enforcement officer or the
prosecutor is concerned, the incidence of such cases is as unforeseeable
as the flip of a coin; the option to raise the claim directly lies solely
with the defense.
Indeed, perhaps the flipped-coin image puts the matter best. If
a court has no reason to believe that entertaining a search and seizure
claim in every case in which it is proffered will have greater deterrent
effect than entertaining the claim in fifty percent of the cases chosen
at random, there is substantial justification for flipping the coin.
Fifty percent of the persons affected whom Congress wants convicted
would thus be convicted, and the conduct of the law enforcement offi-
cers none the worse. Of course no court would flip a coin in fact;
that is not a way in which a court may operate; it appears intolerably
arbitrary and would furnish cause for dangerous resentment by the
criminal accused. What is wanted is a line or lines to serve the
flipped coin's purpose without the flipped coin's manifest caprice.
"Standing" and "attentuation" doctrines are no more than this; the
historically sanctioned distinction between direct and collateral attack
5 5 Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963) (Wong Sun's challenge to
Yee's narcotics).
56 E.g., Bynum v. United States, 274 F.2d 767 (D.C. Cir. 1960); Morgan v.
United States, 319 F.2d 711 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 84 Sup. Ct. 158 (1963);
United States v. Hughes, 311 F.2d 845 (3d Cir. 1962); Wells v. United States, 311
F.2d 409 (10th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 373 U.S. 925 (1963) (§ 2255). And see the
forfeiture cases collected in United States v. $1,058.00 in United States Currency,
323 F.2d 211 (3d Cir. 1963) (claim of illegality not constitutional); Note, 72 YAIL
L.J. 1062, 1067 (1963) ; cf. Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U.S. 519 (1952) ; e.g., Orcutt v.
Wyoming, 308 F.2d 61 (10th Cir. 1962). See also People v. Parham, 32 U.S.L.
Week 2136 (Cal. Sept. 12, 1963). Compare State v. Cory, 382 P.2d 1019 (Wash.
1963) (electronic eavesdropping on defendant-attorney interviews); Judge Wright
concurring, in Gilliam v. United States, 323 F.2d 615, 616 (D.C. Cir. 1963) (police
brutality).
-7 Cf. Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 218 (1960). I concede that the
"standing" and "attenuation" doctrines have not been put explicitly on the ground of
practical limitation upon the deterrent principle. Neither has any other explanation
been offered for them. Once the theory of judicial compensating dispensation has
been put aside, however-as I think it must be, see notes 48-49 supra,-there remains
no satisfactory basis for the doctrines but the desirability and possibility of drawing
lines, consistent with effective deterrence, which yet do not make every constable's
blunder the occasion of a criminal's escape.
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provides another available line, probably clearer than these, and which
in addition, in another aspect, tends to serve the finality factors dis-
cussed above.5
It will be objected that I am being cavalier with fundamental
constitutional rights and years of human life. The years are years
which valid legislation has provided shall be time served, and the
rights at best are a hypostasis of all the remedies which the courts for
sufficient reason give. Once a court has recognized that in the case
of A and B and C certain consequences favorable to them are required
by the interests of the social order, there is naturally a tendency to
regard the consequences as "rights" of A, B, and C, and to demand
their extension to D, who would be similarly circumstanced but for
the fact that the social interests in question appear to be amply served
by application of the consequences in three cases out of four. If D is
indistinguishable from A, B, and C save by some unseemly fluke-or
if the cost of extending the consequences to D is not considerable-the
court may properly refuse to draw the line at D. But the cost in the
search and seizure cases is, I think, substantial, and I would make
available distinctions. I entirely concede we do not now know enough
about the practical working of the exclusionary rule or the practical
impact of collateral litigation to draw the final balance with assurance.
"[F] or the present, I should not increase the handicap on society." r9, 60
Z8 One possible resolution of the exclusionary problem is to leave the application
of the exclusionary rule, to some extent, to the discretion of the trial judge-as the
English, for example, handle violations of the Judge's Rules. In exercising such
discretion, a federal district judge might take account, inter alia, of the gravity of
the constitutional violation, other remedies practically available in the particular case,
the Government's need for the evidence sought to be suppressed, and the nature of the
crime charged. There are serious dangers in such a proposal-among them, (1)
introduction of a new litigable issue with its opportunities for appellate reversals
requiring retrial; (2) possible actual or apparent arbitrariness on the part of the
trial judges; (3) possible development in practice of accepted "exceptions" to the
exclusionary rule which in fact operate to write holes in the fourth amendment; (4)
possible failure of the system as a whole to maintain the incidence of exclusion at
an effective deterrent level. On the other hand, under the present practice which
requires the judge inexorably to decapitate the Government if he finds even the least
egregious, least intrusive constitutional violation-a violation, perhaps, attributable
largely to the vagueness of concepts like probable cause, search "incident" to arrest,
consent-it is not evident to me that the wanted sympathy of the district judges, triers
of fact, toward the purposes of the fourth amendment will invariably be maintained.
59 Mr. Justice Jackson's separate opinion reported in Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49,
57, 62 (1949).
60 The text of this Comment deals with the appropriate disposition of a § 2255
motion which raises a search and seizure claim without alleging particularizing cir-
cumstances calculated to obstruct the claim's presentation in the conviction proceedings.
No such allegations are recited in the Fourth Circuit (Sutton) case. I would handle
allegations of this sort as follows:
(a) Botched presentation by counsel, note 17 supra, or counsel's negligent failure
to raise or preserve the claim. The discussion in text accompanying notes 45-59
leads me to conclude that relief should be denied unless counsel's conduct is so grossly
inept as to sustain a sixth amendment ineffective-assistance claim. See notes 17, 34
supra. In matters of guilt as well as matters of fair procedure, our litigation system
largely commits the fortunes of an accused to the practically unreviewable efficacy of
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his lawyer; I am least disturbed that he should be bound by his lawyer's lack of ability
or effort in the search and seizure case, where the exclusionary claim which counsel
botches is a "right" given the accused only in a representative capacity. I would
give relief in situations meeting generally applicable ineffective-assistance standards
(by which I do not mean to approve the extremely illiberal standard that prevails
today), not to vindicate the accused's exclusionary "right" but to vindicate his interest
and the system's interest in the fact and appearance that the accused be not convicted
without at least minimally tolerable assistance of counsel for his defense. The right
to counsel is not merely a procedural device for assuring other interests of the
accused; it is an independently significant element of fair and fair-seeming procedure,
and should be enforced as such. See People v. Ibarra, 32 U.S.L. WEEK 2242 (Cal.
Nov. 14, 1963), which may, however, carry the principle too far on the facts.
(b) New evidence. Note 18 supra. In the case of some claims other than search
and seizure, allegations of new evidence not meeting the requirements of FED. R. CaM.
P. 33 might suffice to tip the balance, see text accompanying notes 30-37 supra, in
favor of collateral relief. In the search and seizure situation my principal reasons
for denying a collateral remedy clearly apply notwithstanding such new evidence.
See text accompanying notes 45-59 supra. The case of after-discovered evidence
pertinent to a search and seizure contention and which does meet the rule 33 require-
ments is, for me, a borderline case, but I would grant the relief. I am influenced by
concern lest a contrary rule encourage prosecutorial concealment or the justified
suspicion of prosecutorial concealment, for in any case in which facts become known
to the defense only after conviction it is difficult to ascertain and virtually impossible
to prove the extent to which the prosecution is responsible for information having
remained unknown at an earlier date. In this aspect, I think sufficient protection is
afforded by the generally applicable standards of rule 33. This is not the place to
discuss those standards in detail; it may be noted that the due diligence requirement
has seen some recent relaxation in favor of indigent defendants with court-appointed
counsel. Delbridge v. United States, 262 F.2d 710 (D.C. Cir. 1958); Helwig v.
United States, 162 F.2d 837 (6th Cir. 1947) ; Smith v. United States, 283 F.2d 607
(D.C. Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 938 (1961), 370 U.S. 950 (1962) (dictum).
(c) Change of law governing the legality of search and seizure. Because the
purposes of the exclusionary rule are not served by retrospective application of new
rules governing the conduct of law-enforcement officers, I would deny relief. Cf.
Bender, supra note 13.
(d) Other obstructions to presentation of the claim in the conviction proceedings.
Note 34 supra. These should be treated in the same manner as claims that counsel's
representation was inadequate, and for the same reasons. The discussion in the text
accompanying notes 45-59 supra indicates that there is no reason to allow collateral
attack in these cases unless the obstruction is of such a nature-the bribed judge, mob
domination, government suppression of appeal papers, etc.-as itself to amount to vio-
lation of due process of law. Due process violations of this character, of course,
carry their own justifications for collateral vindication. See note 34 supra; cf. Bator,
supra note 8, at 455-60.
I do not ignore an argument which may be made for collateral relief in many
of these cases: that to allow collateral attack furnishes a spur for the improvement
of unsatisfactory criminal trial procedures. Within the federal judicial system itself,
it seems to me the argument is not weighty. True, better procedures are called for:
broader discovery, more searching inquiry before the acceptance of guilty pleas, more
adequate systems for the appointment of competent counsel. But the Supreme Court's
rulemaking power is wide and if visibly bad procedures do not provide the motive for
their own correction, more is wrong with the administration of criminal justice than
§ 2255 can remedy.
